By Stephen Kemble, M.D.
Counter Punch, May 22, 2025
Privatization of publicly funded Medicare and Medicaid, managed care, and “value-based payment” (1) have failed to reduce cost or improve population health despite over 30 years of trying, and a new paradigm for health policy is needed. This article summarizes key health policy concepts and the implications of different payment systems and offers recommendations for design of an optimally cost-effective system enabling universal high-quality care at lowest cost.
Key Concepts
1. Should Health Care be Financed as a Public Good or with Market Competition?
Public funding is appropriate for essential public services necessary for everyone—funded by taxes and paid for with budgets based on cost of operations, with no opportunity for profit or loss. Examples include police and fire departments, public schools, the military, roads and bridges, and government services. Health care should be added to this list. Other industrialized countries with far more cost-effective universal systems treat health care as a public good, not a commodity.
Marketplace financing uses competition, market forces, private enterprise, and opportunity for profit and risk of loss. This works well for consumer goods, industry and manufacturing, hotels and restaurants, fuel and food production, and housing (except for those in poverty). These are appropriately subject to market forces, but health care is not.
2. Ethics: Professional vs Commercial Ethics
Professional ethics, traditional in medicine and other professions, put patient or client interests and welfare first, ahead of personal financial interests.
Commercial ethics prioritize financial interests of owner(s) or shareholders. Patients or clients (and taxpayers) are viewed as consumers from whom money can be extracted.
Reliance on professional ethics in health care is not perfect, but it works much better than commercial ethics and there are effective ways to deal with outliers who engage in unethical practices. It would be far less costly to manage outlier practitioners than to try to control mega-corporations that have amassed deep pockets at taxpayer expense.
Profiteering and the corporatization of health care, with substitution of commercial for professional ethics, is the main root cause of excessive cost and dysfunction in U.S. health care.
3. Insurance Risk:
The entity that covers the unpredictable variability in healthcare cost bears insurance risk. Direct payment of providers with fee-for-service means claims received will be variable and somewhat unpredictable, and risk is retained by the payer.
Government programs may contract payment to private fiscal intermediaries with capitation (payment per-member, per-month), as in Medicare Advantage, Medicaid Managed Care, and Medicare Accountable Care Organizations, shifting insurance risk onto the intermediary. A fiscal intermediary contracting to assume risk will always try to over-charge—usually to assure around 90% chance of profit, 10% risk of loss.
4. Excessive Cost of U.S. Health Care:
The managed care paradigm blames excessive cost on fee-for-service with its presumed incentive to provide unnecessary care and over-utilization. The solution offered is “value-based payment” (see below) or up-front funding for care of a defined population with capitation (2). But the U.S. has never had higher utilization compared to other countries that use fee-for-service and whose universal health care costs half as much per person, so fee-for-service cannot be the cause of excessive U.S. healthcare cost (3). The difference between the U.S. and other countries is in administrative cost and pharmaceutical prices, not over-utilization (4). And market financing of U.S. health care means about a third of total cost goes to administration (5,6).
Health Care Payment Systems
1. Fee-for-service (FFS)
Simple FFS is inexpensive to administer, although FFS as implemented in the U.S. is often unnecessarily complex and costly. For doctors, FFS rewards productivity—working harder means more pay. FFS is compatible with “patient first” professional ethics and it is compatible with independent private practice. FFS does not shift insurance risk onto providers of care, so it does not need risk adjustment or linking payment to diagnostic coding, and up-coding is not an issue.
However, FFS can reward unnecessary treatment. FFS is more likely to be abused when billing is separated from direct contact with the patient, allowing substitution of commercial ethics for professional ethics. Abuse of FFS is lowest with doctors in independent practice who bill out of their office, more problematic with doctors employed by a large group practice or hospital, and worst with for-profit ownership of doctors’ practices by an insurance company or private equity (7). Current trends are in the wrong direction.
For government programs, paying doctors and hospitals directly with FFS means government retains insurance risk and must cover the variability in claims received. However, the larger the risk pool the more manageable this unpredictability becomes, and reserve funds and re-insurance can manage budgetary uncertainty without shifting risk to third-party intermediaries.
2. Salaries for doctors
Salaries are inexpensive to administer, do not create incentives to over- or under-treat, and are compatible with “patient first” professional ethics. However, payment with salaries requires an employer, which can be a problem if the employer is profit-seeking and paid with either fee-for-service divorced from contact with the patient or capitation with its incentive for profiteering. Salaried doctors who can control their schedule/workload may be tempted to become less productive, but this can be mitigated with salary plus a small productivity incentive.
3. “Value-based payment” and capitation
“Value-based payment” systems hold doctors and hospitals accountable for quality and cost of care, even when cost and quality outcomes depend largely on patient characteristics that are beyond the control of care providers. “Capitation” is an advanced form of “value-based payment,” defined as up-front payment per-capita, based on the average per-person cost for a defined population of “members.” Value-based payment and capitation shift insurance risk onto care providers.
Capitation is a simple concept, that seemingly should be inexpensive to administer and provide cost control because care delivery must live within a capitated budget. But capitation is not the same as a simple budget, and in a competitive setting introduces inherent perverse incentives, requires added administrative burdens and costs, and does not assure budgetary control.
- Up-front payment per member requires members, and performance on quality metrics and cost depends heavily on which members are captured.
- Gaming the risk pool: Competition for members rewards capturing the healthy and avoiding the sick.
- Capitation requires risk adjustment, which is administratively expensive, can’t be done anywhere near accurately enough to deter risk pool gaming (8), AND…
- Risk adjustment incentivizes up-coding diagnoses to game the risk-adjustment formula. Up-coding is heavily abused by capitated, risk-adjusted Medicare Advantage (8) and Medicaid Managed Care plans, exploiting government funding.
- Capitation rewards skimping on care since less care means more of payment can be kept, but capitation deters necessary as well as unnecessary care (9).
These incentives align to raise administrative cost and worsen disparities in care, and they conflict with professional ethics, contributing to physician moral injury.
Government programs (Medicare and Medicaid) may think capitation of fiscal intermediaries is a convenience because per-member payment is fixed for a contract year. However, payer risk due to changes in enrollment remains, and predictable funding is not assured over subsequent contract periods. Capitated fiscal intermediaries can keep unspent funds, inviting profiteering by plans guided by commercial instead of professional ethics. And government contracts with capitated plans means loss of control of the budget year-to-year, because in practice plans can extract whatever raises they want by gaming financial data reported to government (10).
For doctors, payment with capitation is independent of office visits, how often a patient is seen, or even whether a “member” is seen at all. Capitated doctors were protected from loss of income when patients stopped coming to the office during the COVID-19 pandemic. In theory, capitation does not require linking every service to a procedure code, but in practice payers using capitation often require fee-for-service claims for budgeting and benchmarking purposes, precluding administrative savings. And the perverse incentives and administrative costs of capitation listed above all apply.
4. Paying hospitals and other institutional providers
Fee-for-service
Hospital fee-for-service billing is extremely complex and heavily gamed, with chargemaster fee-setting, cost-shifting across different insurance lines of business, unreimbursed care, different in-network and out-of-network fees, and data reporting for value-based payment schemes. Large savings could be realized by paying hospitals with global budgets (see below) instead of fee-for-service.
Capitation
Attributing “members” to a hospital is problematic unless the hospital is part of a closed system with members who signed up for that system (e.g. Kaiser). The perverse incentives inherent to capitation listed above apply to hospitals in capitated systems.
Global budgeting
Simple global budgeting of hospitals (as in Canada) pays hospitals with global operating budgets based on cost of operations, including salaries for employed doctors and other professionals, plus separate budgets for capital improvements based on community need. Simple global budgeting of hospitals does not involve capitation (no “members”) or risk shifting and can’t be easily gamed like fee-for-service or “value-based payment.” Hospital administrative costs per capita in Canada (in US dollars) are less than a quarter of those in U.S. hospitals (11).
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has been promoting the AHEAD model (“Advancing All-Payer Health Equity Approaches and Development”) (12), which includes a version of global hospital budgets applied on top of fee-for-service with rates standardized across all payers, with claims revenue reconciled to the budget at the end of the year, plus partial capitation with attributed “members” and “value-based” add-ons. These include pay-for-performance and incentives to address inequities and social determinants that are largely not under the control of the hospital. This version of hospital budgeting has none of the administrative savings of simple global budgeting, and in fact piles on more administrative burdens and cost.
Recommendations for universal care at lowest cost
1. Health care should be publicly financed by government, and the government payer should retain insurance risk, with no sub-contracting to risk-bearing fiscal intermediaries. Risk is most cost-effectively managed with broadest possible risk pooling plus financial reserves and/or re-insurance.
2. The major focus of reform should be on reducing administrative cost and therefore prices, not “managing” utilization of care.
3. Physicians could be either in independent practice or employed, and hospitals could be either privately or publicly owned, but ownership of doctors’ practices and hospitals by for-profit corporations or private equity and the corporate practice of medicine should be banned by law.
4. “Value-based payment” introduces perverse incentives and high administrative costs that preclude real value and should have no place in health care.
5. Large administrative savings could be achieved with simplified, standardized payment of care providers. Simplified fee-for-service would be appropriate for doctors in independent practice, with all procedures reduced to professional time required and hourly rates based on required training. Fee-for-service based on time and training would be much fairer and less costly to administer than attempting to assign a relative value to each of thousands of procedure codes (13). Payment should be based on the value of the time and expertise of the professional performing a procedure instead of attributing value to the procedure itself.
6. Hospitals, other institutional providers, and community-based health services should be paid with global budgets, with employed doctors paid with salaries.
7. Pharmaceutical prices should be regulated and negotiated by government.
8. Necessary administrative functions and quality assurance may be publicly administered or contracted out to an Administrative Services Only contractor on a non-risk basis.
Healthcare Cost Implications
Savings would come from markedly reducing billing and collections costs for doctors and hospitals, reduced administrative cost for the government single-payer, negotiated pricing for pharmaceuticals and durable medical equipment, and eliminating the high administrative cost of competing private plans. Further savings would result from a much-improved practice environment for primary care that eliminated disincentives for practice in under-served rural and urban areas, expanding access to primary care in the most cost-effective settings and reducing preventable ER visits and hospitalizations.
If all these recommendations were implemented, U.S. per-capita healthcare costs would likely fall into the range of Canada and other countries with universal systems that cost at least 30-40% less than what the U.S. now spends on health care.
Dr. Stephen Kemble is a psychiatrist in Hawaii who has followed health policy for decades and is a proponent of cost-effective universal healthcare.
References
- Rooke-Ley H, Ryan AM. A New Medicare Agenda—Moving Beyond Value-Based Payment and the Managed Care Paradigm. JAMA 2025; 333(14):1203–1204.
- Schroeder SA, Frist W. Phasing Out Fee-for-Service Payment. N Engl J Med 2013; 369:2029-2032.
- Himmelstein D, Woolhandler S. Global Amnesia: Embracing Fee-For-Non-Service—Again. J Gen Intern Med 29, 693–695 (2014).
- Papanicolas I, Woskie LR, Jha AK. Health Care Spending in the United States and Other High-Income Countries. JAMA 2018; 319(10):1024–1039.
- Himmelstein DU, Campbell T, Woolhandler S. Health Care Administrative Costs in the United States and Canada, 2017. Ann Intern Med 2020; 172:134–142.
- Downing NL, Bates DW, Longhurst CA, Physician Burnout in the Electronic Health Record Era: Are We Ignoring the Real Cause? Ann Intern Med 2018; 169:50-51.
- Harris E. Private Equity Ownership in Health Care Linked to Higher Costs, Worse Quality. JAMA 2023; 330(8):685-686.
- Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. Report to the Congress: Medicare payment policy. Washington DC: MedPAC; March 2024.
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, “Some Medicare Advantage Organization Denials of Prior Authorization Requests Raise Concerns About Beneficiary Access to Medically Necessary Care,” April 2022, https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/OEI-09-18-00260.pdf.
- Goldsmith J, Mosley D, Jacobs A. Medicaid Managed Care: Lots of Unanswered Questions (Part 2). Health Affairs Blog, May 5, 2018.
- Himmelstein DU, Jun M, et al. A Comparison of Hospital Administrative Costs in Eight Nations: US Costs Exceed All Others By Far. Health Affairs 33, No. 9 (2014):1586–1594
- States Advancing All-Payer Health Equity Approaches and Development (AHEAD) Model. CMS.gov. 2024.
- Kemble SB, Kahn J. Optimizing Physician Payment for a Single-Payer Healthcare System. Int’l J Social Determinants of Health and Health Svcs, May, 2023.